William Hayes v. WalMart Stores Inc by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-2-2013 
William Hayes v. WalMart Stores Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"William Hayes v. WalMart Stores Inc" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 313. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/313 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2522 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM HAYES 
 
v. 
 
WAL-MART STORES, INC., doing business as  
SAM’S CLUB; ABC CORPORATIONS I-V (fictitious 
names) 
 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., doing business as SAM’S CLUB,  
      Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00460 
(Honorable Jerome B. Simandle) 
______________ 
 
Argued: January 8, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 2, 2013) 
 
2 
 
 
Charles B. Casper, Esq. 
John G. Papianou, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Paul H. Zoubek, Esq. 
Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads 
123 South Broad Street 
28
th
 Floor 
Philadelphia, PA  19109 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Daniel Lapinski, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer 
90 Woodbridge Center Drive 
8
th
 Floor 
Woodbridge, NJ  07095 
 
James C. Shah, Esq. 
Shepherd, Finikelman, Miller & Shah 
475 White Horse Pike 
Collingswood, NJ  08107 
 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an interlocutory appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(f). Plaintiff Hayes brought a putative class action against 
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Wal-Mart, asserting claims for violation of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, and unjust 
enrichment in connection with Wal-Mart’s sale of extended 
warranty plans through Sam’s Club retail stores. Defendant 
Wal-Mart contests the trial court’s order granting plaintiff 
Hayes’ motion for class certification. Post certification, we 
decided Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC, 687 F.3d 
583 (3d Cir. 2012), which thoroughly explored Rule 23’s 
class definition, ascertainability, and numerosity 
requirements. Because those requirements are key issues in 
this appeal, we will vacate the certification order and remand 
in light of Marcus. 
 
I. 
 Sam’s Club is a members-only retail warehouse owned 
and operated by Wal-Mart. Each of Sam’s Club’s stores has a 
section for certain clearance items, called “as-is” items. Items 
may be designated for the as-is section for a variety of 
reasons. They may be: (1) display items, which were removed 
from their packaging to show to members; (2) items that were 
purchased and then returned; (3) items that are brand-new but 
that Sam’s Club wants to clear out, called “last one” items; or 
(4) items that were damaged in-Club. Each item in the as-is 
section is marked with an orange sticker that states the 
product is being sold as-is. 
 
 When a person desires to purchase an as-is item, a 
Sam’s Club cashier at the point of sale scans the item. The 
original price appears on the point of sale system, and the 
cashier must perform a “price override” by manually entering 
the discounted price. Sam’s Club’s software records the fact 
that a price override was performed, but does not include the 
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reason for the override. Significantly, price overrides can be 
made for reasons other than the fact that an item was 
designated as-is, including when a member requests a 
discount because the item is sold for less elsewhere, or when 
a member purchases an item and later finds it on sale. 
Separately, each of the Sam’s Club stores keeps a handwritten 
log of items that are marked as-is and the reason for doing so. 
It is notable that the log does not track the sale of those items.  
 
 Sam’s Club contracted with National Electronics 
Warranty Corporation (“NEW”) to sell extended warranty 
products called Service Plans for various items sold in the 
store. The Service Plans state NEW will not cover “products 
sold ‘as-is’ including but not limited to floor models (unless 
covered by a full manufacturer’s warranty on your date of 
purchase) and demonstration models.” As indicated, Service 
Plans will cover as-is items that still have their 
manufacturers’ warranties, including “last one” items that are 
sealed and brand-new, as well as some display items.
1
 
                                              
1
 Plaintiff contends no as-is items are covered by 
manufacturers’ warranties at the time of sale. Br. on Behalf of 
Appellee William Hayes at 6. The trial court did not make 
explicit findings as to whether or which as-is items were 
covered by manufacturers’ warranties at the time they were 
sold. But the court’s decision to exclude as-is items covered 
by manufacturers’ warranties from the class definition may 
suggest that it concluded such items do exist. The record 
appears to support that conclusion. See J.A. vol. II, A69 ¶ 16 
(Patulak Decl.) (“‘[L]ast one’ items, particularly electronic 
items, are often brand new, sealed items, that are marked as-is 
to clear out remaining inventory. That the item was sold as-is 
does nothing to void any manufacturer’s warranty.”); id. at 
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 Plaintiff Hayes made two separate purchases of as-is  
items. On each occasion, a Sam’s Club employee offered and 
Hayes agreed to purchase a Service Plan for the as-is item. At 
the time of his purchases, Hayes contends he was not told 
whether the Service Plan would actually cover his as-is item. 
On August 7, 2008, Hayes purchased an as-is power washer 
for $100 along with a Service Plan that cost $5.26. There is 
no evidence that Hayes was offered a refund for the Service 
Plan or that he had problems with the product and sought to 
have it serviced. On July 1, 2009, Hayes purchased an as-is 
television set for $350 along with a Service Plan that cost 
$39.85. After taking the television set home and discovering 
it was missing certain pieces, he returned to the store. The 
store eventually provided Hayes with a manual and remote. A 
store employee also informed him that Sam’s Club should not 
have sold him the Service Plan because it did not cover the 
television and offered to refund him the cost of the Service 
Plan. Hayes declined.  
 
 On January 26, 2010, Hayes filed suit on behalf of 
himself and all other persons who purchased a Service Plan 
for an as-is product from Sam’s Clubs in New Jersey since 
January 11, 2004. He asserted a violation of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act, breach of contract, and unjust 
enrichment. The trial court certified the following Rule 
23(b)(3) class: 
 
All consumers who, from January 26, 2004 to 
                                                                                                     
A68, ¶ 7 (Patulak Decl.) (“Display items are sometimes 
covered by their manufacturers’ warranty. It depends on the 
terms and conditions of the manufacturer’s warranty.”). 
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the present, purchased from Sam’s Clubs in the 
State of New Jersey, a Sam’s Club Service Plan 
to cover as-is products. Excluded from the Class 
are consumers whose as-is product was covered 
by a full manufacturer’s warranty, was a last-
one item, consumers who obtained service on 
their product, and consumers who have 
previously been reimbursed for the cost of the 
Service Plan. 
 
The trial court found the class, under this amended 
definition, fulfilled the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
Specifically, the court found the class was ascertainable 
because members could be determined with reference to 
objective criteria. The court found the class was sufficiently 
numerous because Sam’s Club had records of 3,500 member 
transactions during the class period that included both a price 
override and the purchase of a Service Plan; the court 
reasoned that if even 5% of those price overrides were for as-
is items that were ineligible for Service Plan protection, the 
class would be sufficiently numerous. The court found that 
common issues predominated over individualized issues 
because the essential elements of each claim were susceptible 
to common proof. In addition, the court found Hayes’ 
purchase of a Service Plan for the as-is power washer was a 
proper basis for class certification but not his purchase of a 
Service Plan for the as-is television set, since the Service Plan 
for the television set was honored when Sam’s Club replaced 
the missing remote. We granted Wal-Mart’s interlocutory 
appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
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II.
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 “[Class] certification is proper only if ‘the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of 
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.’ Frequently that ‘rigorous 
analysis’ will entail some overlap with the merits of the 
plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped.” Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) 
(citations omitted) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 
                                              
2
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) 
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). Plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under 
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Neither 
party contested subject matter jurisdiction before the trial 
court. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) 
(“The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own 
initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the 
entry of judgment.” (citation omitted)). Although we cannot 
help but note the relatively small value of plaintiff’s 
purported loss in conjunction with the limited number of 
putative class members, we decline to reach the issue of 
jurisdiction here. The Supreme Court has instructed that it is 
appropriate to reach class certification issues first, if they are 
dispositive, because their resolution is “logically antecedent 
to the existence of any Article III issues.” Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997). Moreover, the 
record on appeal is insufficient for us to determine that 
plaintiff cannot meet the $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy 
requirement to a legal certainty. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. 
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938). If the class 
is permitted to go forward on remand, CAFA jurisdiction 
should be explored by the district court.  
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457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). “Factual determinations 
supporting Rule 23 findings must be made by a 
preponderance of the evidence,” In re Hydrogen Peroxide 
Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008), and the 
burden of proof rests on the movant, id. at 316 n.14. “A 
party’s assurance to the court that it intends or plans to meet 
the requirements is insufficient.” Id. at 318. 
 
 “We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision ‘rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.’” Id. at 312 
(quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001)). We review whether 
an incorrect legal standard has been used de novo. Id. 
 
III. 
 Wal-Mart asserts the trial court erred in certifying the 
class because plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing 
(A) there is a reliable and administratively feasible method 
for ascertaining the class, (B) the class is sufficiently 
numerous to qualify for class action treatment, and (C) issues 
common to the class predominate over issues affecting only 
individual members. In part (D), we consider sua sponte 
whether Hayes has constitutional standing to bring suit in this 
case.  
 
A. 
The trial court found the class was ascertainable 
because the amended definition specifies “‘a particular group 
that was harmed during a particular time frame, in a particular 
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location, in a particular way,’” and uses objective criteria. 
Hayes v. Wal-Mart, 281 F.R.D. 203, 210 (D.N.J. 2012) 
(quoting Rowe v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 262 F.R.D. 
451, 455 (D.N.J. 2009)). The court explained that although 
plaintiff need not “‘prove that class members have been 
injured for purposes of defining the [class],’” id. (quoting 
Rowe, 262 F.R.D. at 455), the amended definition nonetheless 
excludes those individuals who have not suffered comparable 
harm.  
 
Wal-Mart asserts the trial court erred in failing to 
consider whether it is administratively feasible to ascertain 
the class. Wal-Mart argues the trial court will have to engage 
in impractical mini-trials to determine if putative class 
members fall within the class definition. 
 
It is plaintiff’s burden to show that a class action is a 
proper vehicle for this lawsuit. See Comcast Corp. v. 
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (“The class action is 
an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by 
and on behalf of the individual named parties only. To come 
within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class 
action must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with 
Rule 23.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). As “an 
essential prerequisite” to class certification, Marcus, 687 F.3d 
at 592, plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the class is ascertainable. See In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (“Factual determinations necessary 
to make Rule 23 findings must be made by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”). In Marcus, we explained that 
ascertainability is important because it “eliminates serious 
administrative burdens . . . by insisting on the easy 
identification of class members”; allows for the best notice 
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practicable, and thereby protects absent class members; and 
protects defendants by clearly identifying the individuals to 
be bound by the final judgment. 687 F.3d at 593 (quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
Marcus made clear that ascertainability entails two  
important elements. First, the class must be defined with 
reference to objective criteria. Id. Second, there must be a 
reliable and administratively feasible mechanism for 
determining whether putative class members fall within the 
class definition. Id. at 593-94. We explained that “[i]f class 
members are impossible to identify without extensive and 
individualized fact-finding or ‘mini-trials,’ then a class action 
is inappropriate.” Id. at 593; see also William B. Rubenstein, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3:3 (5th ed. 2011) 
(“Administrative feasibility means that identifying class 
members is a manageable process that does not require much, 
if any, individual factual inquiry.”). We noted that other 
courts have gone so far as to hold “that where nothing in 
company databases shows or could show whether individuals 
should be included in the proposed class, the class definition 
fails.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593.  
 
The plaintiffs in Marcus sued BMW and Bridgestone 
for selling allegedly defective run-flat tires (RFTs). Id. at 588. 
The class definition sought to capture owners and lessees who 
purchased or leased new BMWs with original-equipment 
Bridgestone RFTs from BMW dealerships in New Jersey and 
whose tires had gone flat and been replaced. Id. at 592. We 
found the proposed class raised “serious ascertainability 
issues.” Id. at 593. In particular, lease and purchase records 
from BMW dealerships were over-inclusive because they did 
not document the brand of tire on each car leased or sold. Id. 
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And not all owners and lessees took their vehicles back to a 
BMW dealer to have their tires replaced—hence repair 
records were under-inclusive. Id. at 594. Remanding the case 
to the district court, we said: 
 
If Marcus attempts to certify a class on 
remand, the District Court—adjusting the class 
definition as needed—must resolve the critical 
issue of whether the defendants’ records can 
ascertain class members and, if not, whether 
there is a reliable, administratively feasible 
alternative. We caution, however, against 
approving a method that would amount to no 
more than ascertaining by potential class 
members’ say so. For example, simply having 
potential class members submit affidavits that 
their Bridgestone RFTs have gone flat and been 
replaced may not be “proper or just.” . . . 
Forcing BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true 
absent persons’ declarations that they are 
members of the class, without further indicia of 
reliability, would have serious due process 
implications. 
 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Xavier v. Philip Morris USA 
Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).  
 
 Because the able trial court here did not have the 
benefit of Marcus’s guidance, it did not consider whether it 
would be administratively feasible to ascertain class 
members. In discussing numerosity, however, the court noted 
that Sam’s Club had no method for determining how many of 
the 3,500 price-override transactions that took place during 
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the class period were for as-is items. The court did not see 
this as a barrier to class certification, reasoning that plaintiff 
should not be hindered from bringing a class action because 
defendant lacked certain records.  
 
But the nature or thoroughness of a defendant’s 
recordkeeping does not alter the plaintiff’s burden to fulfill 
Rule 23’s requirements. Nor has plaintiff cited any statutory 
or regulatory authority obligating Wal-Mart to create and 
maintain a particular set of records. Cf. In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (explaining that even a district 
court’s broad discretion to control proceedings “does not 
soften the rule: a class may not be certified without a finding 
that each Rule 23 requirement is met”). Rule 23’s 
requirements that the class be administratively feasible to 
ascertain and sufficiently numerous to warrant class action 
treatment cannot be relaxed or adjusted on the basis of Hayes’ 
assertion that Wal-Mart’s records are of no help to him. 
 
Given the trial court’s finding that Wal-Mart lacks 
records that are necessary to ascertain the class, to be 
successful on remand, plaintiff must offer some reliable and 
administratively feasible alternative that would permit the 
court to determine: (1) whether a Sam’s Club member 
purchased a Service Plan for an as-is item, (2) whether the as-
is item was a “last one” item or otherwise came with a full 
manufacturer’s warranty, and (3) whether the member 
nonetheless received service on the as-is item or a refund of 
the cost of the Service Plan.
3
 Cf. id. at 319 (explaining that, in 
                                              
3
 Although these inquiries overlap with the merits, each of 
these inquiries addresses an element of the class definition—
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class action litigation, “‘[a] critical need is to determine how 
the case will be tried’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note, 2003 Amendments)). Based on the existing 
record, plaintiff has not fulfilled this burden. But we will 
nonetheless remand because plaintiff did not have the benefit 
of our decision in Marcus when he submitted evidence of the 
class’s ascertainability.  
 
To summarize, plaintiff must show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that there is a reliable and administratively 
feasible method for ascertaining the class. See Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 593-94; In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. 
This petition for class certification will founder if the only 
proof of class membership is the say-so of putative class 
members or if ascertaining the class requires extensive and 
individualized fact-finding.  
 
B. 
 The trial court found the class was sufficiently 
numerous to warrant class action treatment. It reasoned that 
since Sam’s Club has data showing approximately 3,500 price 
override transactions for which a Service Plan was also 
purchased, if even 5% of those price overrides were for as-is 
items ineligible for Service Plan protection, the class would 
be sufficiently numerous under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Wal-
Mart argues there was no factual basis to infer the number of 
class members and that the court engaged in impermissible 
speculation to find the proposed class fulfilled the numerosity 
                                                                                                     
the determination of each of these inquiries is therefore 
essential to ascertain the class. 
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requirement. In fact, Wal-Mart asserts plaintiff failed to prove 
that even a single person meets the class definition.
4
  
 
Under Rule 23(a)(1), the class must be “so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable.”5 This 
requirement assures “that class action treatment is necessary.” 
Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, 
“[a] party seeking class certification must . . . be prepared to 
prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties . . . .” 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Mere speculation as to the number 
of class members—even if such speculation is “a bet worth 
making”—cannot support a finding of numerosity. Marcus, 
687 F.3d at 596.  
 
The district court in Marcus engaged in an inquiry  
similar to that by the court in the present case. The plaintiff in 
Marcus submitted 29 of 582 nationwide complaints from 
purchasers and lessees regarding BMWs with RFTs of any 
brand, but did not specify whether, as the class definition 
required, the complainants purchased or leased their cars in 
New Jersey nor how many of the complainants had 
Bridgestone-brand RFTs. Id. at 595-96. Despite the dearth of 
                                              
4
 Wal-Mart asserts Hayes does not meet the class definition 
because he testified that he does not know if his power 
washer came with a manufacturer’s warranty. J.A. vol. II, 
A155 at 76:13-23. We take up this issue in Part D, infra. 
5
 While “[n]o minimum number of plaintiffs is required to 
maintain a suit as a class action,” we stated on the facts of at 
least one case that “generally if the named plaintiff 
demonstrates that the potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 
40, the first prong of Rule 23(a) has been met.” Stewart v. 
Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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geographic- and brand-specific evidence, “the District Court 
found that the New Jersey class met the numerosity 
requirement because ‘it is common sense that there will be 
more members of the class than the number of consumers 
who complained—probably significantly more,’ and 
‘common sense indicates that there will be at least 40.’” Id. at 
596 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 08-5859, 
2010 WL 4853308, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2010)).  
 
We held the district court abused its discretion, stating:  
Mere speculation is insufficient. Of course, 
Rule 23(a)(1) does not require a plaintiff to 
offer direct evidence of the exact number and 
identities of the class members. But in the 
absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff must 
show sufficient circumstantial evidence specific 
to the products, problems, parties, and 
geographic areas actually covered by the class 
definition to allow a district court to make a 
factual finding. Only then may the court rely on 
“common sense” to forgo precise calculations 
and exact numbers.  
 
Given the complete lack of evidence 
specific to BMWs purchased or leased in New 
Jersey with Bridgestone RFTs that have gone 
flat and been replaced, the District Court’s 
numerosity ruling crossed the line separating 
inference and speculation.  
 
Id. at 596-97 (citations omitted). 
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Here, plaintiff did not fulfill his burden of supplying 
circumstantial evidence specific to the products and problems 
involved the litigation and instead premised his argument for 
numerosity on improper speculation. The only concrete 
numerical evidence presented to the court was that New 
Jersey Sam’s Clubs had on record 3,500 transactions that 
included both a price-override and the sale of a Service Plan. 
But there is no factual basis for determining how many of 
these 3,500 transactions included the purchase of a Service 
Plan for an as-is item that was not a “last one” item and that 
did not have a valid manufacturer’s warranty—the specific 
product involved in this litigation. Nor was there evidence of 
how many of these transactions involved Service Plans that 
were not ultimately honored, either by service or refund—the 
specific problem involved in this litigation. In short, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence presented to 
the trial court is that the number of class members would be 
equal-to-or-less-than 3,500 and equal-to-or-greater-than 
zero.
6
 Within that range, we can only speculate as to the 
number of class members.  
 
                                              
6
 Plaintiff contends the trial court had before it evidence that 
less than 40 of the 3,500 price-override transactions were 
related to “last one” items. For this proposition, plaintiff relies 
on Sam’s Club’s handwritten logs, which document the items 
designated as-is and the reason for doing so. But the trial 
court made no such finding on this point. Moreover, even if 
less than 40 of the 3,500 price-override transactions were for 
“last one” items, there is no evidence in the record addressing 
how many of the 3,500 price-override transactions were for 
other as-is items covered by manufacturers’ warranties at the 
time of sale. 
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And contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, it was not 
defendant’s burden to show how many of the 3,500 price-
override transactions occurred for a reason other than the 
purchase of an as-is item. It was plaintiff’s burden to 
demonstrate numerosity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Since plaintiff did not fulfill this burden, there was no basis to 
infer that the class is sufficiently numerous to qualify for 
class action treatment. 
 
Speaking more generally, where a putative class is 
some subset of a larger pool, the trial court may not infer 
numerosity from the number in the larger pool alone. Accord 
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 
2009) (finding the district court engaged in impermissible 
speculation where it inferred numerosity for a Florida-only 
class “without the aid of a shred of Florida-only evidence,” 
but only evidence on a national scale). The trial court must 
engage in a “‘rigorous analysis,’” Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 
(quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161), and find each of Rule 
23(a)’s requirements met by a preponderance of the evidence, 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307, before granting 
certification.  
 
Similarly, the trial court cannot take a wait-and-see 
approach to numerosity or any other requirement of Rule 23. 
Certification may not be granted because the plaintiff 
promises the class will be able to fulfill Rule 23’s 
requirements, with the caveat that the class can always be 
decertified if it later proves wanting. To certify a class in this 
manner is effectively to certify the class conditionally, which 
Rule 23 does not permit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note, 2003 Amendments (“A court that is not 
satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met 
18 
 
should refuse certification until they have been met.”); In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 319-20 (explaining the 2003 
amendments to Rule 23 made clear that class certification 
may not be granted on a tentative basis). The trial court must 
“make a definitive determination that the requirements of 
Rule 23 have been met before certifying a class.” In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320. 
 
The evidence presented in the trial court was 
insufficient to support a finding of numerosity. On remand, 
plaintiff must show either direct or circumstantial evidence 
specific to the problems and products involved in the 
litigation so the trial court may determine whether there are in 
fact sufficiently numerous parties to warrant class action 
treatment. Without such evidence, plaintiff cannot prove 
numerosity by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 
C. 
 Wal-Mart reprises its ascertainability concerns under 
the predominance framework, contending common issues do 
not predominate over the individual inquiries necessary for 
determining which of the 3,500 price-override transactions 
involved the sale of as-is items, whether the as-items were 
“last one” items or otherwise came with manufacturers’ 
warranties, and whether members who purchased Service 
Plans for ineligible as-is items nonetheless received service or 
refunds.  
 
We have previously noted that the line dividing 
ascertainability from predominance is blurry. See Marcus, 
687 F.3d at 594 n.3 (“[A]scertainability problems spill into 
the predominance inquiry . . . .”). But despite some overlap, 
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they remain separate prerequisites to class certification and 
serve distinct purposes: the ascertainability requirement 
focuses on whether individuals fitting the class definition may 
be identified without resort to mini-trials, id. at 593, whereas 
the predominance requirement focuses on whether essential 
elements of the class’s claims can be proven at trial with 
common, as opposed to individualized, evidence, In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311.  
 
The individual inquiries that Wal-Mart has cited all 
focus on whether putative class members fit the class 
definition. Thus, we think Wal-Mart’s objection to 
certification on the basis of these inquiries is better analyzed 
under the ascertainability framework than the predominance 
framework. And as stated above, we agree with Wal-Mart 
that on remand the trial court must consider whether there is a 
reliable and administratively feasible approach for resolving 
the necessary inquiries.  
 
Moreover, since ascertaining the class is logically 
antecedent to determining whether issues common to the 
class predominate over individual issues, we do not reach the 
question of whether Hayes could satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance—a requirement “even more demanding than 
Rule 23(a)” and “designed for situations ‘in which class-
action treatment is not as clearly called for.’” Comcast, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1432 (some quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dukes, 
131 S. Ct. at 2558); see also Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 
F.3d 273, 297 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Parallel with Rule 23(a)(2)’s 
commonality element, . . . Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement imposes a more rigorous obligation upon a 
reviewing court to ensure that issues common to the class 
predominate over those affecting only individual class 
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members.”).  
 
On remand, should the trial court determine that Hayes 
has satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a), it should 
reevaluate whether the putative class satisfies the  
predominance requirement.
7
 
 
D. 
In its brief, Wal-Mart draws our attention to Hayes’ 
statement in deposition that he does not know if either the 
power washer or television set he purchased from Sam’s Club 
came with a manufacturer’s warranty. Notably, the trial court 
                                              
7
 At this stage, we merely note that Hayes’ breach of contract 
claim appears problematic. “To establish a breach of contract 
claim, a plaintiff has the burden to show that the parties 
entered into a valid contract, that the defendant failed to 
perform his obligations under the contract and that the 
plaintiff sustained damages as a result.” Murphy v. Implicito, 
920 A.2d 678, 689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). In his 
complaint, Hayes contends Wal-Mart breached the Service 
Plan by not intending to perform its promise—apparently, the 
promise to insure Hayes’ as-is product. Yet Hayes admits 
that, by its very terms, the Service Plan excludes as-is 
products from insurance coverage. Given this admission, 
Hayes may have conceded that Wal-Mart followed the terms 
of the Service Plan by intending not to insure the as-is 
products explicitly excluded from Service Plan coverage. 
Hayes has not reconciled these contrary positions or 
explained how breach could be shown in a manner common 
to the class. Indeed, his inconsistent positions may preclude 
any possible common proof of breach. 
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excluded from the class definition any consumer who 
purchased a Service Plan for an as-is product that was 
covered by a full manufacturer’s warranty at the date of 
purchase. The court reasoned that any such product would be 
insured under the terms of the Service Plan. 
 
It is axiomatic that the lead plaintiff must fit the class 
definition. See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33 
(1962) (“[Plaintiffs] cannot represent a class of whom they 
are not a part.”). Although different courts have asserted 
different origins for this axiom,
8
 they arrive at the same 
conclusion: where the lead plaintiff does not fit the class 
definition, the class may not be certified.
 
Wal-Mart does not 
contend we should consider Hayes’ admission under any 
particular framework. In fact, Wal-Mart highlights Hayes’ 
admission in the context of numerosity—contending Hayes 
has failed to show that even one class member exists. But in 
addition to bolstering Wal-Mart’s numerosity argument, we 
think Hayes’ admission draws into question his standing to 
sue. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974) (“To have standing to sue as a class 
representative it is essential that a plaintiff must be a part of 
that class, that is, he must possess the same interest and suffer 
the same injury shared by all members of the class he 
represents.”). 
 
                                              
8
 For instance, courts have found the lead plaintiff did not  
fulfill the “adequacy” requirement of Rule 23(a)(4), was not 
similarly situated to those he sought to represent, or lacked 
standing. See 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1761 (3d 
ed. 2005) (collecting cases). 
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
explained that  
 
[s]tanding has both constitutional 
dimensions rooted in Article III’s Case or 
Controversy Clause and prudential dimensions 
that are closely related to Art. III concerns but 
[are] essentially matters of judicial self-
governance. The rule that a class representative 
must be part of the class is one of prudential 
standing, related to the broader principle that 
the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal 
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to 
relief on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties. 
 
Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
502 F.3d 91, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2007) (second alteration in 
original) (citations, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). 
But where the plaintiff’s ability to fall within the class 
definition not only depends upon whether the plaintiff 
sustained the same injury as the class, but also upon whether 
the plaintiff sustained any injury at all, we find the issue of 
the plaintiff’s constitutional standing also invoked.9  
 
                                              
9
 “Because constitutional standing is a jurisdictional 
requirement, ‘[w]e are obliged to examine standing sua 
sponte where standing has erroneously been assumed 
below.’” Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 338 n.10 (3d Cir. 
2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 110 (2001)), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 933 (2013). 
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To have constitutional standing, “[a] plaintiff must 
always have suffered ‘a distinct and palpable injury to 
himself’ that is likely to be redressed if the requested relief is 
granted.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 
91, 100 (1979) (citation omitted) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976)). “It is the 
fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant—not to 
others—which justifies judicial intervention.” McCabe v. 
Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 162 
(1914). “[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to 
represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or 
controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on 
behalf of himself or any other member of the class.” O’Shea 
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). 
 
In this case, the issue of whether Hayes fits the class 
definition overlaps with the issue of whether he suffered an 
injury. Hayes only meets the class definition if the as-is 
power washer he purchased was not covered by a 
manufacturer’s warranty.10 Similarly, Hayes only incurred an 
injury—e.g., being defrauded or paying for a valueless 
product—if the as-is product for which he purchased a 
Service Plan was explicitly excluded from Service Plan 
coverage, since, importantly, Hayes does not contend that he 
ever sought service on his power washer and was denied. 
Thus, if Hayes has a valid manufacturer’s warranty, he not 
                                              
10
 We agree with the trial court that Hayes’ purchase of a 
Service Plan for his television set cannot form the basis for 
class certification because it was honored when Sam’s Club 
replaced the missing remote. Sam’s Club also offered to 
refund Hayes the cost of that Service Plan, but Hayes refused 
to accept the refund. 
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only falls outside the class definition, but he also has a valid 
Service Plan and therefore has not been injured.  
 
Presently, Hayes does not know if he has a valid 
manufacturer’s warranty. As a result, we do not know if his 
suit presents an Article III case or controversy. On remand, if 
the trial court certifies the class, it must determine whether 
Hayes falls within the amended class definition and sustained 
an injury.
11
 If Hayes does not fall within the class definition 
                                              
11
 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 
(1992) (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the 
burden of establishing [the elements of standing]. Since they 
are not mere pleading requirements but rather an 
indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must 
be supported in the same way as any other matter on which 
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner 
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of 
the litigation.”); see also Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Because at issue in 
a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction—its 
very power to hear the case—there is substantial authority 
that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy 
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. . . . 
[T]he existence of disputed material facts will not preclude 
the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of 
jurisdictional claims. Moreover, the plaintiff will have the 
burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.”); Apex 
Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th 
Cir. 2009) (explaining that because federal “jurisdiction 
cannot be conferred by consent of the parties, if the facts 
place the district court on notice that the jurisdictional 
25 
 
and has no injury, the case must be dismissed.
12
 
 
IV. 
On the existing record, this class does not survive the 
ascertainability and numerosity requirements as articulated by 
Marcus. But because plaintiff did not have an opportunity to 
address these requirements in the trial court, we will vacate 
the certification order and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
allegation probably is false, the court is duty-bound to 
demand proof of its truth” (quotation marks omitted)). 
12
 Substitution of the lead plaintiff could only occur if there 
were multiple lead plaintiffs. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class 
Actions § 2:8 (“[I]f a case has only one class representative 
and that party does not have standing, then the court lacks 
jurisdiction over the case and it must be dismissed.”). 
